Markets reacted strongly and positively to the Federal Reserve policy meeting this week. “Plunged” is usually a word bandied about hyperbolically by sensationalist headline writers; however, it is not far from the truth that since peak wall-of-worry less than two months ago, the steep falls in US, German and UK government bond yields justifies the “plunge” description; if the opposite of “plunged” is “rocketed”, that is what has happened to bond prices as the corollary to falling yields (in the past 10 years the only time of comparable magnitude in bond price and yield change in a very compressed period was the few weeks leading up to the combined central banks’ actions to steady markets at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020).

For the central banks, more a case of “steady there, steady! Stand by your beds”

With interest rates being held flat against the most recent inflation data that continued its sideways trend of the past 6 months (headline CPI 3.1% down from 3.2%, core inflation excluding food and fuel remaining at 4%), all the anticipation was generated by the accompanying commentary. The nuance was that the Fed is now considering the timing of interest rate cuts next year, shifting away from maintaining them on hold for the foreseeable future. Chairman Powell still worries about US wage inflation but senses the worst of the pressure is over. Is he coming under pressure politically to ease the cost of capital burden for borrowers as we approach an election year? Almost certainly. It would not be the first time. It sticks in our mind that when he was standing for reappointment in November 2021 and the US mid-terms were in the offing, Biden figuratively knee-capped Powell telling him to get a grip on inflation or clear out of the Fed and make way for someone who would.

 

Whether Powell asserts his independence and resists the pressure remains to be seen. It will be evident in the timing of prospective cuts: unless there is a sudden dramatic change to the economic data pointing to strong evidence of medium-term price stability and the 2% inflation target, the sooner he retreats from his long-held “higher for longer” position the more likely he has been susceptible to political arm-twisting. As well as economic factors, US governments seeking re-election do not like to see stock markets on a losing streak as electors contemplate which box to tick in the polling booths; it is a politically cynical reaction to the pragmatic voter’s dilemma: “do I vote for the people making me wealthier or the ones making me poorer?”. Rising markets would do nicely. We are certainly not complaining!

 

The Bank of England and the European Central Bank have also held interest rates steady. For the Bank, Governor Andrew Bailey insists that UK inflation is far from defeated, rates must stay high for “sufficiently long” to restore price stability. In contrast with the US policy committee which voted unanimously to hold rates and the talk was of prospective cuts, the UK Monetary Policy Committee’s was a majority decision: six in favour of holding, three insisting that rates should still rise from here. Despite the lowest inflation rate of the three jurisdictions at 2.4%, with zero economic growth and the highest unemployment, the ECB nevertheless cited eurozone unit labour costs as a medium-term inflationary concern. Judging by the response marking bond yields even lower, markets think Bailey and the ECB’s Lagarde will be smoked out of their trenches too. Where the policies of the different central banks are anticipated to diverge in terms of timing and the magnitude of changes in interest rates, that is being reflected in exchange rate differentials, already evident in the recent weakness of the US dollar (or for us in the UK, the converse, the strengthening of sterling).

 

There also remains the problem of debt. It is a subject we have addressed ad nauseam in these columns as western governments cynically deliver enduring deficits in their annual budgets regardless of the consequences. Taking current inflation rates and government deposit rates, for the first time in years most western governments are now experiencing positive real interest rates applied to their accumulated mountains of debt. The fiscal drag is significant especially as the negative cost of the interest rate being greater than the inflation rate more than offsets the perceived benefit of being able to “inflate away” the debt. Exemplifying the effect, UK government debt has now reached £2.6 trillion on which the estimated interest bill this financial year will exceed £95bn, £50bn more than in 2019. If “debt interest” were a government spending department, it would have the second biggest budget behind health & social care (£182bn) but well ahead of all the rest including education (£82bn) and defence (£53bn). To point out the obvious, ultimately it is taxpayers’ money which foots the government interest bill. While savers very much welcome positive real interest rates, for borrowers the opposite is true and in the worst cases is unsustainable. 

It’s all about inflation. But whose?

In this great Mexican stand-off between the markets and the central banks where spreads between official base rates and government bond yields have widened perceptibly, all the speculation is about who is right and wrong about inflation and what the appropriate rate of interest is to maintain stability at the target rate of 2%. That inflation rate in the US comes in two forms, the headline CPI and Core inflation which excludes the cost of food and fuel notwithstanding that however inconvenient their volatility is for economists’ tidy spreadsheets, for the consumer they are absolute necessities. Both are based on official but selectively contrived baskets of goods and services purchased by the average consumer. But what is the ‘average consumer’? We are all very different as individuals with heterogenous lifestyles and domestic financial and economic circumstances. It is not unusual to sense that what the government reports as the rate of inflation is substantially at odds with one’s own.

 

A US website helpfully illustrates the point. We keep an eye on the Chapwood Index, the very unofficial barometer of what middle America sees is actually happening with annual prices, not what they are being told is the rate of change arrived at from a government-contrived basket of goodies. Taken every 6 months nationwide, the pollsters ask Americans to report on around five hundred goods and services that they buy habitually, and to compare prices with last year. It includes rent, college fees, baseball tickets, cars, insurance, air fares, burgers, waffles, you name it. In the pre-pandemic period, while US core inflation was hovering around the 1-2% level, Chapwood was regularly reporting 10%. Last year as measured by Chapwood the simple arithmetic mean across fifty cities was 12.7%. In the first half of this year, as the official CPI fell from 6.4% to 3.0%, Chapwood followed the downward trend but only subsided to 9.6%.

When perception becomes reality

In a job market still with full employment (unemployment is under 4%), official wage growth is 5.7%; Powell sees real wages rising but at a slower clip than earlier this year when wage inflation was 7%.  But even if the Chapwood index continues to drop a couple of points to today, you see the problem: Powell thinks inflation-adjusted real wages are growing. Middle America thinks their real wages are still declining.

 

The Chapwood Index is unsophisticated and full of flaws; but then arguably, however detailed, CPI and Core have their own drawbacks. Chapwood’s technical flaws themselves are irrelevant. What matters more than anything is perception: what real people think is happening to their own personal inflation rate and whether their wages in reality are keeping up with their outgoings. It is when the two ends do not meet and the electorate thinks they are being taken for fools by policymakers and government that they make their displeasure felt in the polling booths. Voters and Powell currently appear to be on very different pages. It is all going to play out in 2024 culminating in the Presidential election on November 5th. Let alone on bonfire night itself, there are going to be plenty of fireworks before we get there.

 

The Jupiter Merlin Portfolios are long-term investments; they are certainly not immune from market volatility, but they are expected to be less volatile over time, commensurate with the risk tolerance of each.  With liquidity uppermost in our mind, we seek to invest in funds run by experienced managers with a blend of styles but who share our core philosophy of trying to capture good performance in buoyant markets while minimising as far as possible the risk of losses in more challenging conditions.

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