The relevance to the world economy is simple: notwithstanding the drive to rely less on China as a source of finished goods and components (‘onshoring’), it remains the hub of international trade and sits firmly at the base, the anchor-point of most global supply chains. Until the pandemic when it was regularly growing at over 5% and approaching 18% of the world’s GDP, it was estimated that China alone accounted for 30% of every incremental point in global growth. If it falters while the US is also sluggish (and between them they are 43% of world economic activity), then global GDP struggles too.

Even in a largely supplicant society, the pressure arising from these economic factors is a potential political challenge to the CCP in general and Xi Jinping specifically as an autocrat (he was aware of the unrest arising from repressive lockdown measures and relented; he might be tough but he is not tone deaf). As a big trading economy, China cannot hide from the vagaries of international commodity prices and there are elements of its inflation/deflation cycle that are beyond its direct control. But the communist philosophy is built around the command economy; after a period of flirting with incorporating limited forms of capitalism, Xi is explicit in his intent to restore full socialist principles, albeit “with Chinese characteristics.” The extreme volatility of the property market seen over the past half decade in which tens of thousands of surplus accommodation units have been built and remain unoccupied is entirely a function of bad economic policy. A fifth of the youth population in a socialist command economy being out of work is also symptomatic of policy with substantial flaws.

Which brings us back to China’s strategic ambitions for its self-proclaimed New World Order. Time will tell whether they are affordable or achievable: as many western commentators disbelieve that the Chinese economy will surpass that of the US as think it inevitably will.

But economic size is not the only consideration. Looking outwards, China’s diplomatic tentacles are spreading; evidence includes brokering peace talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and it again being suggested that Beijing might be the agent if not to reconcile Russia and Ukraine, then at least bring a cessation to hostilities. Elsewhere as the world transitions to the new era of alternative fuels, China is making every effort to control or at least heavily condition the supply of those natural resources which will be increasingly important to maintaining living standards: copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and a host of others. It is no coincidence that China is investing heavily in the major geographic sources in sub-Saharan Africa and South America. Further, if a political threat were posed to the regime in Beijing thanks to unsustainable demographics, poor domestic policy planning and reactions from the West such as those seen this week, it could deflect internal criticism by falling back on the time-honoured means of nationalistic sabre-rattling to create national unity. US intelligence still estimates that by 2027 China will have the military capability to recover Taiwan with at least an evens chance of success; the starting premise of the US military is that Taiwan will be targeted by China: it is merely a question of by what means its recovery is actioned and when. China is also likely to keep up its asymmetric attrition with cyber incursions against western government and corporate systems.